This paper is concerned with modelling and statistical analysis of the failure mechanism of a piece of railway. The background is a study of failure and inspection data from Dovrebanen, a part of the Norwegian railway, from Trondheim to Lillehammer.
Introduction
In this paper we will present a statistical model of railway lines with application to a section of the Norwegian railway line called Dovrebanen. We use a Markov chain model with transition rates adjusted so that the stationary distribution matches the observations.
We distinguish between degraded and critical failures of the railway line. When a degraded failure (crack) occurs, the railway is still functioning, and the crack can only be revealed by inspections of the line. Those inspections are performed at regular intervals by Ultrasonic Inspection Cars (UIC). However, at each inspection there is a probability p of detecting a degraded failure, roughly estimated to be between 0.5 and 0.7. A piece of rail which is degraded is more prone to suffer a critical failure than a piece of rail in the OK state. When a critical failure occurs, the failure has to be repaired in order to maintain regular traffic.
The model and estimation technique is believed to be useful also for other applications involving imperfect inspections and failure developments.
The Model
The development of degraded and critical failures is modelled by a Markov chain. The model includes four different states for degraded failures and two different states for critical failures. In addition we have the OK state, so that the Markov chain has seven states altogether (see Figure 1) . The critical failures can be divided into two subgroups; failures due to degradation, denoted F1 and shock failures, denoted F2. The latter failures happen when the rail is exposed to big external forces like rolling rocks. Those failures can not be detected by inspection. The critical failures due to degradation, however, can be avoided by repair if they are discovered at inspections. As mentioned above, the model has four different degraded states. The first, denoted D1u, is for minor degraded failures. If a rail is detected in this state, then there is a transition to state D1d, where the observation is made more intensive so that a failure due to degradation is not possible. If a failure is observed for the first time in the degraded state called D2u, the failure is repaired immediately. A subscript u on the degrades states indicates that a degraded failure is undetected in the first degraded state D1u, as degraded failures detected in state D1u can not fail due to degradation. Likewise, a subscript d indicates a degraded failure that was observed in state D1u.
One of the interesting aspects of the model is that we have continuous-time Markov transitions between the different states in the time spans between inspections, while at the inspections we have discrete time transitions. We model this as two Markov chains, continuous and discrete, respectively. Note the complicating matters resulting from the fact that different transition schemes apply according to whether a degraded failure is detected in the first degraded state or not. In Figure 1 , the dotted lines are transitions at the inspections and the solid lines are transitions inside an inspection interval T.
We partition the rail into small pieces of rail so that one piece is in only one of the states OK, D1u, D1d, D2u, D2d, F1 or F2. In order to fit the model to the data, we now introduce the variables Un and Vn. Un tells the true state for a small piece of rail immediately before inspection and Vn tells the true state immediately after inspection. We assume we can treat the transition rates in Figure 1 as parameters in a Markov chain with intensity matrix A. Then using a suitable method for solving Markov chains, for example the computer package Maple, we can easily find the probability that inside an inspection interval T, given start in state i, we have a transition to state j. We call this P(T). Also denoting the probability that we detected a degraded failure in state D1u by p1 and the probability that we detected a degraded failure in state D2u by p2, we can introduce the matrix R for the transitions at the inspections,
R
For the matrices A, P(T) and R, the rows and columns 1 to 7 correspond to the states OK, D1u, D1d, D2u, D2d, F1 and F2 respectively. Combining R and P(T) and also assuming we can treat the degradation process as a stationary process, we state the transition matrix for Un, Q = R*P(T), and the transition matrix for Vn is W = P(T)* R. For further explanation we refer to H.Amundrustad and B.H.Lindqvist [1] .
Denoting the true state for a piece of rail by Xn and the observed state for a piece of rail by Yn we can find the stationary distributions Π for the true states Un when n is big.
Estimating the parameters
We now have the theory for estimating the transition parameters. In Table 1 we have listed the input parameters for the estimation process.
In order to estimate the parameters we also have to make several assumptions, and the most important ones are listed below: -The number of failures is equally distributed per year. They are also equally distributed over the complete railway line. Inserting the stationary probabilities Π = [Π1, Π2, Π3, Π4, Π5, Π6, Π7] for the true states Xn we have the following equations when recalling that Yn was the observed state for a small piece of rail short time before inspection, P(Yn=OK)=Π1+Π2+Π4*(1-p2), P(Yn=D1u)=0, P(Yn=D1d)=Π3, P(Yn=D2u)=Π4*p2, P(Yn=D2d)=Π5, P(Yn=F1)=Π6 P(Yn=F2)=Π7.
As we obviously do not have any observations in state D1u, we estimate this by
It is then easy to find the stationary probabilities Π. Remembering that Q = R * P(T) is the transition matrix for Un with stationary matrix Π, we can finally solve Π = Π * Q for the transition parameters and get the following estimates λ = 0.44168*10^-7, µ = 0.53977*10-6, ω = 0.45425*10^-2, ν = 0.57978*10^-2, σ = 0.91181*10^-4 δ = 0.66335*10^-3.
Interpreting the Parameter Estimates
Now having estimated the transition rates we use basic theory for Markov chains to calculate the times spent in the different states and also the mean time to failure for the two different critical failure modes F1 and F2. We note however, that the rates estimated are the naked failure rates, and therefore the expected staying times in Table 2 are for situations where no repair is performed. For futher discussion on naked failure rates, see [2] . We see here that the sojourn time in the state D1u is very short compared to the other staying times, which indicates that most degraded failures proceed to state D2u without even being exposed to testing at the inspection.
Reliability Measures
As the number of entries to the critically failed state F2 does not change with the inspection interval T, we keep focusing on the critical failures due to degradation. In the previous section we found an estimate of the expected staying time in state D1u, and we will now use this together with the transition rate µ to find the probability that a random kilometer contains an undetected degraded failure of severity D1, P(1 km contains an undetected degraded failure of type D1)=P(D1u)=1000*µ* E[TD1u]=0.125. Now introducing a new reliability concept (ROCOD2u), which is the rate of occurrence of degraded failures of severity D2 not detected in state D1u,
This quantity will be the rate of entries to D2u in our model. Similar to P(D1u), we can now find P(D2u), which is the probability of one kilometer of rail containing a degraded failure of severity D2 not already detected in D1u. We get
We see that roughly every third kilometer contains a degraded failure of severity D2 without this already being detected in state D1u. Finally we can use this to find the rate of occurrence of failures of type F1 (ROCOF1) and therefore also the MTTF for the failure mode F1, MTTF=1/ROCOF1=1/(ν* P(D2u))=1/( ν*µ*E[TD1u]*ω*E[TD2u])= 5424 days=14.9 years.
We can now conclude that a critical failure due to degradation for one kilometer of rail occurs every 14.9 years. We remember that the MTTF for failure mode F2 was 62 years. We can then calculate the total MTTF for the complete critical failure process. This MTTF applies asymptotically. We get We can finally state that, in total, a critical failure of either type will happen every 12 years for a random kilometer if the inputs remain constant as displayed in Table 1 .
